An essay on the putative knowledge of textbook economics
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Abstract

The article pursues the two related questions of how economists pretend to know and why they want to know at all. It is argued that both the form this knowledge has taken and their motivation for knowing have undergone a fundamental change during the course of the 20th century. The knowledge offered by important contemporary economic textbooks has little in common with objective and explicitly scientifically motivated knowledge. Rather, their contents and forms follow a productive end, aiming at the subjectivity of their readers.

Keywords economic education, philosophy of economics, Foucault, neoliberalism

JEL codes A10, A13, A20, B13, B40

1. Introductory remarks

The subject of this essay is the knowledge of economists. More precisely, it is not the content, but the form of their knowledge. It seems to me that this form took a decisive turn in the 20th century and that what economists pass on in textbooks today has little to do with knowledge in a scientific sense. In this way, however, they no longer follow an understanding of knowledge that prevailed, for example, in the early tradition of neoclassical theorization. Secondly, this change in the concept of economic knowledge is based on a change in the fundamental will or motivation of economists. What is the primary purpose of their activities? I think that this question can neither be answered from an inner-disciplinary, nor from a merely inner-scientific perspective. Rather, it must be reflected today in the light of the politico-economic context of economic science and education.

The theses of this twofold change in the understanding of economic knowledge as well as in its underlying motivation will be presented by referring to a particularly strong contrast: on the one hand, using the example of those who introduced a consistent mathematical methodology into economics at the end of the 19th century, thereby establishing the neoclassical tradition which is still dominant today; on the other hand with reference to contemporary textbook literature, which presumably sets out to introduce newcomers to the science of economics. The reference to didactic literature is based on a characterization of economics as a textbook science, which as such is constitutively dependent on the mediation of canonized knowledge (Bäuerle, 2017).

The claim is not made here to meticulously elaborate the two different cultures of knowledge and will. Rather, the possibility of a systematic demarcation should be raised so that this border and its historical realization can become the object of reflection and criticism. In this sense, the basic intention of this essay is not to present a detailed empirical work, but rather to offer a basic interpretation scheme for a multitude of findings in current economic textbook research (Graupe, 2019, 2017; Graupe & Steffestun 2018; Bäuerle 2019, 2017; Maeße, 2018; Zuidhof, 2014; Giraud, 2014, 2011; Peukert, 2018; van Treeck & Urban, 2016).
This essay is inspired by a study carried out by Silja Graupe (2017), in which she draws a distinction between different epistemic cultures in early neoclassical economics on the one hand and contemporary economic textbooks on the other. In contrast to Graupe’s work, this essay will focus on a conceptual selectivity of two forms of economic knowledge and related forms of will. To this end, I shall rely on Michel Foucault’s examination of political economy and its concept of knowledge in particular, and finally on thoughts of Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah (2017), who also attest to a drastic shift in economic science in the post-war period with regard to its underlying concept of knowledge.1

The question that should guide us through the first part of my presentation is: What understanding of economic knowledge underlies the most important textbooks today? I limit myself to three highly internationally popular textbooks of introductory courses (Econ101) (Bäuerle, 2017, p. 253 f.): the archetype of the genre, Paul Samuelson’s Economics, Gregory Mankiw and Marc Taylor’s Economics, who hold about 20% of the international market share (cf. ibid.) and finally the Principles of Economics by Robert Frank, Ben Bernanke and Louis Johnston.

2. The knowledge of economic textbooks

Samuelson/Nordhaus address my leading question as follows:

“Our primary goal is to emphasize the core economic principles that will endure beyond today's headlines [...] there are a few basic concepts that underpin all of economics [...] We have therefore chosen to focus on the central core of economics – on those enduring truths that will be just as important in the twenty-first century as they were in the twentieth” (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2010, pp. xviii-xix).

The two textbook authors are obviously interested in basic economic principles that apply to the entire economics discipline. “Eternal truths’ which are valid independently of time and are not subject to any historical conditionality. In older editions, Samuelson emphasizes that they also claim validity independently of spatial situations (Russia, China, USA) and political affiliations (Republicans / Democrats) (Samuelson, 1976, vii). The knowledge of economists is therefore a knowledge that promises universal validity, it is context-free. Frank et al. illustrate the supposed natural-law quality of economic truths by referring to an example from everyday life:

“Most of us make sensible decisions most of the time, without being consciously aware that we are weighing costs and benefits, just as most people ride a bike without being consciously aware of what keeps them from falling. Through trial and error, we gradually learn what kinds of choices tend to work best in different contexts, just as bicycle riders internalize the relevant laws of physics, usually without being conscious of them” (Frank et al., 2013, p. 7).

1 In the case of the latter, I follow the changes mentioned not only with regard to economic education, but also with regard to economic research.
In the understanding of the textbook authors there seems to exist, beneath the surface of human action – all human action, a sphere of laws to which that action is as bound just as natural objects are bound to natural laws. These are the economic laws or principles that the textbook aims to explain. But what remains to be done for the economist in the context of a principally law-governed economics?

“Economists try to address their subject with a scientist’s objectivity. They approach the study of the economy in much the same way as a physicist approaches the study of matter and a biologist approaches the study of life: they devise theories, collect data and then analyze these data in an attempt to verify or refute their theories. [...] The essence of any science is scientific method – the dispassionate development and testing of theories about how the world works. This method of inquiry is as applicable to studying a nation’s economy as it is to studying the Earth’s gravity or a species’ evolution” (Mankiw & Taylor, 2014, 17; emphasis L.B.)

Adhering to the model of the natural sciences, Mankiw and Taylor state that as economists they are also using “the” scientific method. As scientists using scientific methodology, theories appear and are tested which explain “how the world works”. Economic science discovers these truths and passes this knowledge on in the context of textbooks and accompanying courses. It thus seems to be a decidedly scientific undertaking, which the textbook authors quoted here agree with. In that last quotation of Mankiw and Taylor we also saw an explicit reference to the basic attitude of their action and thus also the results of this action (economic knowledge) as specifically scientific activity and knowledge: scientific objectivity.

3. Objectivity as an epistemic virtue

Following the work of Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2007), I would now like to introduce objectivity as an epistemic virtue as a second step – in order to subsequently be able to judge whether the knowledge of economists corresponds to this understanding of scientific action.

What is an epistemic virtue? The purpose of all epistemic virtues is stated by Daston and Galison in sharp demarcation from self-knowledge with world-knowledge: “Epistemic virtues in science are preached and practiced in order to know the world, not the self” (Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 39). Epistemic virtues therefore serve as a guideline or ideal for the development of a certain scientific attitude with the aim of recognizing the world: “they are norms that are internalized and enforced by appeal to ethical values, as well as to pragmatic efficacy in securing knowledge” (ibid., pp. 40-1). Virtuous epistemic action – if understood in this particular context as an attitude – is especially demanding for the scientist. Epistemic virtues define how the formation of a scientific self is to be accomplished; a self that cultivates certain traits of character and prevents others: “The mastery of scientific practices is inevitably linked to self-mastery, the assiduous cultivation of a certain kind of self” (ibid., 40). Finally, Daston and Galison examine and understand these virtues in their historical contingency as “fashions” of scientific practice subject to cultural, intellectual, historical, technical, and economic processes of change.
Against this background, Daston and Galison reconstruct how objectivity as an epistemic virtue gained strength during the course of the 19th century, and how it became decisive for a multitude of sciences and their members. What did it mean to be objective back then?

“To be objective is to aspire to knowledge that bears no trace of the knower – knowledge unmarked by prejudice or skill, fantasy or judgment, wishing or striving. Objectivity is blind sight, seeing without inference, interpretation, or intelligence” (ibid., p. 17).

The acquisition of knowledge can only be achieved if the opposite pole of the objective, the subjective, is kept out of the act of perceiving (ibid., p. 36 f.). Only a knowledge freed from subjective influences allows one to hope that the object can actually be grasped in its own way and subsequently represented. Thus, the epistemic virtue of objectivity requires the scientific self to control itself in such a way that the cognitive process is not “polluted” by personal desires, experiences and prejudices. The paradox of the objective scientific self is its obedience to an epistemic rule that makes it the enemy of itself. A “will to willlessness” (ibid., p. 38) commands the objective self to decided self-negation, a kind of epistemic asceticism.

Crucially, the scientist must consciously carry out this self-restriction in order to be able to attain knowledge. The epistemic virtue of objectivity for the scientific self demands a constant distrust of itself; and this distrust must be carried out at every moment of scientific practice in the most precise way. Although in an extreme form the permanent self-exclusion from the epistemic act presupposes a conscious self-relationship. The objective self must know where and when it is transforming the object with subjectivity in order to protect it from it. In its bipolarity, the relationship between self and world is inseparably bound up and must be practiced virtuously for the purpose of knowing the world.

An anchor and guarantor of this scientific balancing act, as already mentioned with regard to the “will to willessness”, is the belief in the strength and freedom of the human will:

“the will asserted (subjectivity) and the will restrained (objectivity) – the latter by a further assertion of will. In Jena and Paris, London and Copenhagen, new ideals and practices of the willful, active self took shape in the middle decades of the nineteenth century” (ibid., p. 228).

The will for objective knowledge aims at knowledge of the world. However, this knowledge has no ultimate, metaphysical quality. It is rather the result of a virtuous epistemic process in an empirical confrontation with the world (cf. ibid., pp. 213-215): “objectivity was conceived in the sciences […] as an epistemological concern, that is, as about the acquisition and securing of knowledge rather than the ultimate constitution of nature (metaphysics)” (ibid., p. 215). This limitation of the primary motivation of scientific inquiry also manifested itself in a shift of the scientific ethos away from the truth-seeking genius to the indefatigable worker, the objective observer.

In the overall view, in connection with the epistemic virtue of objectivity, two forms of knowledge are thus produced: based on a scientific will to knowledge, the scientist must first have and put into practice a virtuous knowledge of what is necessary for a “good” scientific process. If sufficiently considered, the act of knowledge or research then carried out promises to be a scientifically (i.e. objectively) assured knowledge as a result.
4. Objectivity in neoclassical economics

Did scientific developments and the epistemic virtue of objectivity have an influence on economists during the course of the 19th century? And if so, in what form? In his volume “More Heat than Light”, Philip Mirowski has worked out what comprehensive influence the developments in the natural sciences of the 19th century had on the development of marginalism and thus also on the formation of neoclassical theory, which still sets the tone today. This influence also includes the enthusiasm for the objective ideal of knowledge, even if Mirowski does not make this facet the main object of his investigation. Although he reproaches the application of field formalisms and the development of mechanical analogies in the field of economics at the expense of internal coherence in the area of origin (i.e. analytical mechanics) (Mirowski, 1989, pp. 229-31, pp. 272-74), he consistently emphasizes the epistemic intentions and convictions that guided the mathematical economists in their revolution. It was confidence in the increased cognitive faculties of objective natural sciences that allowed the marginalists to adopt mechanical-mathematical methodologies into the science of political economy. This confidence is shared by the fundamental works of early neoclassical economists such as Leon Walras:

“Pure mechanics surely ought to precede applied mechanics. Similarly, given the pure theory of economics, it must precede applied economics, and this pure theory of economics is a science which resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect. If the pure theory of economics [...] is a physico-mathematical science like mechanics or hydrodynamics, then economists should not be afraid to use the methods and language of mathematics. The mathematical method is not an experimental method; it is a rational method” (Walras, 1965[1874], p. 71).

Further, William Stanley Jevons:

“[John Stuart; L.B.] Mill [...] speaks of an equation as only a proper mathematical analogy. But if Economics is to be a real science at all, it must not deal merely with analogies; it must reason by real equations, like all the other sciences which have reached at all a systematic character” (Jevons, 1965[1871], p. 101).

And finally, Irving Fisher:

“There is a higher economics just as there is a higher physics, to both of which a mathematical treatment is appropriate [...] The introduction of
mathematical method marks a stage of growth – perhaps it is not too extravagant to say, the entrance of political economy on a scientific era [...] Up to this time political economy had been the favorite field for those persons whose tastes were semi-scientific and semi-literary or historical” (Fisher, 1965[1892], p. 109).

In order to enter a scientific state, political economy had to incorporate the exact methods of the natural sciences, according to the unanimous opinion. What the marginalists undoubtedly differ in is the degree and quality of scientific objectivity they applied to their own work. Although the pronounced imagery and analogies to the analytical mechanics of the works of Jevons, Edgeworth, Walras or Fisher, for example, suggest that they are committed to the epistemic virtue of mechanical objectivity (Daston & Galison, 2007, ch. 3), the methodological remarks or chapters rather show a sympathetic proximity to what Daston and Galison call “structural” objectivity: a kind of radical form of objectivity, which hoped to keep subjectivity in total control by consistently escaping into purely abstract, usually mathematical methodology and a scepticism towards pictorial representations of phenomena and empirical observation in general (Daston & Galison, 2007, ch. 5). If this interpretation is true, then confidence in the methods of the natural sciences in economics even led to the loss of a concretely experienced, empirically accessible world (see Düppe, 2009, 50ff. for theoretical considerations and Pühringer & Bäuerle 2019 for its empirical manifestation in economic education).

Regardless of the question of how the epistemic virtues of the marginalists showed itself in individual cases, they were all guided by epistemic virtues and were thus interested in the most successful epistemic process possible (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, p. 25). And a universal benchmark for successful epistemic processes seemed to have been found for many sciences in the field formalisms of Lagrange and Hamilton between 1850 and 1870 (Mirowski, 1989, pp. 35, 201, 217). The mathematical revolution in economics was led by epistemic convictions which in the middle of the 19th century seemed to carry great explanatory potential in the natural sciences with regard to the functioning of the world ("Laplace’s dream"). Thus, in connection with Daston and Galison’s observations on the one hand and Mirowski’s on the other, the thesis could be formulated that a "will to willessness" as of the 1870s also led to the decision for alternative methodologies in political economy and was finally reflected in the change of name of the discipline to "economics".

**Figure 2** Hierarchy of will and knowledge of objective economic knowledge, based on Daston & Gallison (2007)

5. **The knowledge of economists**

The occasional confession contemporary textbooks make with regard to this decidedly scientific, partly also objective tradition is to be doubted on closer inspection. In order to be
able to formulate and prove this doubt, I would like to present an understanding of knowledge, which in my opinion is suitable to classify the one found in economics textbooks. It originates from Michel Foucault’s lectures on the birth of biopolitics and was developed in the immediate discussion of economic science. What kind of knowledge does the discipline of political economy develop according to Foucault?

“The question here [in political economy, L.B.] is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, delinquency, and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a question of showing how these objects were for a long time hidden before finally being discovered, nor of showing how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological products to be dispelled in the light of reason finally having reached its zenith. It was a matter of showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices – from the moment they become coordinated with a regime of truth – was able to make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become something, something however that continues not to exist […] It is not an illusion since it is precisely a set of practices, real practices, which established it and thus imperiously marks it out in reality” (Foucault, 2010[1978], p. 19).

Foucault negotiates economic knowledge as a “dispositive”, as a template of thought which, through the radiance of its true character on the one hand and its animation by human practices on the other succeeds in appearing in reality. Because people attribute truth to dispositifs and begin to align their actions with their immanent laws of truth and falsehood, non-existence – one could also say abstraction – becomes real in the sense that it shapes experience. For Foucault, it is this primarily productive character of dispositifs which puts them at the heart of his power-theoretical considerations. Dispositifs of knowledge are dispositifs of power, whereby Foucault emphasizes:

“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault 1995[1975], p. 194).

Knowledge, one could formulate in reference to this understanding of power, is a production task. Its content indicates both what is and what ought to be, whereby what exists is identical with what ought to be. The peculiarity of this production task thus consists in the fact that it pretends that what is to be known, and thus what is to be produced, already exists: as truth. As the last sentence of the above quote underlines, for Foucault the most important product of modern practices of power is the modern subject itself (cf. also Foucault, 1983, p. 208). The subject must act at the same time as the actor, as well as the target of the production task, for power to be developed at all. Whoever appropriates true knowledge of man, such as their true nature, true preferences, true motivations, etc. makes them the subject of this knowledge, as subordinate (lat.: sub-iectus). And the specific content of knowledge indicates the character of this subjectivity. With the execution of subjection to a specific knowledge, the production task installed in knowledge is realized: the subject processes or produces itself on its basis.
Against the background of such an understanding of subjectivity, knowledge, power and truth, Foucault now reflects on the science of political economy as the decisive supplier of dispositifs of knowledge that set the tone for modernity. According to Foucault, it is the true laws of the economists to whom (initially Western) societies have increasingly devoted themselves since the end of the 18th century and who know how to distinguish between right and wrong actions. While at the time of political economy, knowledge, however, still referred to the leaders of territories and promised to evaluate their actions, the emergence of neoliberal thinking in the first quarter of the 20th century brought about an increase in the significance of economic knowledge for a potential totality of human action. This conceptual expansion, for example by the Chicago School of Economics and the leading figure of neoliberal theorization, Friedrich Hayek, is followed by a global expansion of economic knowledge in terms of its historical effects, so that today it has assumed the rank of a “general style of thought, analysis and imagination” (Foucault 2010[1978], p. 219). This style of thinking, which is actually a form of knowledge, is also characterized by the paradoxical peculiarity of wanting to be realized, although it is assumed to already exist:

“Neoliberalism is [...] understood not only as ideological rhetoric or as politico-economic reality, but above all as a political project that aims to create a social reality that at the same time presupposes it as already existing” (Bröckling et al., 2000, p. 9; my translation).

It is this quality as “already existing” that settles “true knowledge” on an ontological level. It is objective at best in the sense of the English “objective” or the romanic – here Spanish – objetivo: as goal or purpose (of a production process of subjectivity). In this sense, the subject should submit to an “objective” knowledge (of a certain subjectivity) that has always been fixed. It does not subject itself to a fundamentally open epistemic process, but to a self-contained truth. It does not submit to an epistemic virtue, but the act of submission itself now appears as a virtue (Lemke, 2001, p. 85). As guided by this purpose and will, there are also no limits to the production task inherent in economic knowledge, such as those of an object to be recognized, or in extreme cases: of a world to be recognized. The driving force behind this process is not the “will to willessness”, but Nietzsche’s “will to power”, to which Foucault also refers (1991). Not the understanding of the world, but the creation of the world is the purpose of this will and its form of knowledge. For this purpose, this form of will is inherent in the constant increase of its processual efficiency, as well as the expansion of its sphere of action (Foucault 1991b[1978], p. 100).

In terms of content, it is economic virtues that the subject is presented with and advised on in the form of true knowledge. The emerging subjects are economical “in nature”. As such they process a quantified, market-shaped world through a ratio, a calculating thinking, in order to always achieve an indeterminate surplus in this calculating execution. As mentioned at the beginning, I don’t want to and cannot go into the specific contents of what constitutes economic knowledge. However, I like to refer to a discussion of this specific subjectivity, which in my opinion is also reflected in economic textbook literature, namely the money subject Karl-Heinz Brodbeck (Brodbeck, 2009, ch. 5) speaks of.

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2 On the basis of the specific content of economic knowledge (see below), the subject emerging at the moment of his subjugation reflects him- or herself as well as the world surrounding him as ultimately limitlessly objectifiable.
In the combination of its political, unlimited form with an economic, unlimited content lies the remarkable effectiveness of economic knowledge as it can be observed today in processes of economization in various areas of social and private life. As the next but one chapter will show, economization processes today find an important starting point and catalyst in the context of academic economic education.

**Figure 3** Hierarchy of will and knowledge in contemporary economic education based on Foucault (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political will (will to power)</th>
<th>economic knowledge as an ontologized production task</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economic subjects as products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economized world as condition and product of products</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. The information of economists

After encountering Foucault as a first sceptic of a purely scientifically understanding of knowledge in economics, I would now like to introduce Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah, two further scholars who historically trace the knowledge and will of economists and attribute to them a shift from an epistemic to a productive attitude.

In their volume “The knowledge we have lost in information” (2017) they elaborate upon a fundamental change in the cultures of knowledge and will of economists after World War II. This change found its conceptual manifestation in the term *information*. The term spans a bridge from a political project of *The Market* as a central coordination mechanism for social processes to an understanding of the subject which encompasses individuality within this political frame of reference only as a semi-conscious or subconscious reaction to external information (e.g. prices). The processing of information is no longer conceptualized as a conscious act of perception and decision-making. Rather, thinking in the sense of *computing* becomes a collectively unconscious process. And as the specific instance of this collective computing power, The Market comes into play, whose signals for market participants in turn gain the quality of imperatives for action. The central figure for this specific understanding of information integrating macro- and microeconomics was Friedrich Hayek:

> “Hayek came to portray knowledge as completely disengaged from the consciousness of the knower. This was the Hayek of ‘Competition as a Discovery Procedure’, wherein he deemed much of agents’ conscious knowledge as irrelevant to the operation of the well-functioning economy. In this incarnation, some knowledge could only be discovered by the market, and so in this final phase Hayek conceived ideal intentionality of individuals as acquiescing in the market’s signals” (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, p. 152).

3 With regard to empirical case studies in various social contexts see Schimank & Volkmann (2012).

4 With this notation I follow those of Mirowski/Nik-Khah (see next but one quote) and those of Ötsch (2019). On the one hand, it points to the anthropomorphic character of The Market, which is granted human abilities as an independent actor. On the other hand, it refers to the metaphysical character of The Market with superhuman qualities and abilities, which, among other things, give it a primacy over political processes and action (Ötsch, 2019, 10 ff.).
Markets and individuals were understood by Hayek as information processors, but without giving market participants themselves, scientists or others the opportunity to look into the black boxes of these processing procedures. Thus, the results of market-shaped and collectively unconscious processes became the only point of orientation. According to this understanding, truth is not the result of a conscious and human process, but the result of the market:

“For orthodox economists today, truth is not a matter of morality, nor of individual standards of veracity, nor even coherence with some simplistic notion of the scientific method. For the orthodox economist, core doctrine dictates truth is the output of the greatest information processor known to humankind – namely, The Market. […] the wise market participant always defers to the pronouncements of the market” (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, p. 7).

With regard to its qualities as a social coordination mechanism, but also with regard to its “intelligent”, superhuman services of information processing, the market is considered superior in principle by its advocates. In the light of this a priori superiority, not only alternative forms of shaping society, but also scientific foundations or even criticisms of the market are discredited as “fatal conceit” (Hayek 1988[1974]). What remains to be done for economists when taking such self-imposed humility towards The Market for granted? Mirowski and Nik-Khah use the example of three variants of the concept of economic information to show that economists, in sharp distinction to the founding figures of neoclassical theory, mutated from explorers to producers of market-organized processes:

“Before 1980, many people believed that The Market was something that has always existed in a quasi-natural state, much like gravity. It seemed to enjoy a material omnipresence, sharing many characteristics of the forces of nature, warranting a science of its own. […] Where economists once placidly contemplated markets from without, situated in a space detached from their subject matter, so to speak, now they are much less disciplined about their doctrines concerning the nature of economic agency, and much more inclined to be found down in the trenches with other participants, engaged in making markets” (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, pp. 144, 148).

According to Mirowski and Nik-Khah, during the course of the 1980s, economists, released from the detachment of an objective science, began to install and permanently improve markets as information processors in various social configurations (ibid., p. 130), thereby emphasizing that this productive credo originates from a genuinely political intention or program:

“The Market (suitably reengineered and promoted) can always provide solutions to problems seemingly caused by the market in the first place. This is the ultimate destination of the constructivist political program within neoliberalism” (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, p. 57).

While the will of economists was expressed as decidedly scientific before 1980, it was now a political will with social-technical intent which underlay their work. Mirowski and Nik-Khah trace this shift back to the decidedly political intentions of neoliberal thinkers and their post-war institutions, highlighting Friedrich Hayek and the Mont Pèlerin Society as key institutions.
Similar to Foucault’s analysis of the modern subject, the politically minded humility towards the achievements of the market springs from a neoliberal subject whose specific activity no longer lies in understanding or thinking, but rather in subjugating individual and collective life to the truth of a superhuman information processor:

“Neoliberalism influenced the way computational themes would enter economics: the agent would become one small cog in the grand market mechanism. […] Consequently, knowledge no longer looks like it did in the Enlightenment roots of political economy. What happened to the Kantian subject, able to reason for herself, autonomous, and hence an end in herself? Economists’ fascination with information has inadvertently debased their treatment of knowledge – first, for the agent and then, ultimately, for the economists themselves. Now all we have left is information. It was a seemingly technical notion that, reified, was the progressively removed from the grip of the agent who, in turn, would be denied anything that could reasonably be signified as ‘understanding’ or even ‘thought’. This neoliberal subject was banished from the realm of ends, denied any optimality that makes sense, fated to slave away on a supremely complex calculation, churning through a subroutine, Truth always eluding its grasp” (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, p. 240).

In shaping the thinking and acting of a neoliberal subject, the introduction of an economic information concept precisely realized the active notion of the term as a verb (lat.: informare): form, shape, imprint (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, p. 45). Just as in Foucault’s understanding of the subject, such informational subjectivity primarily aims at the production of reality, although Mirowski and Nik-Khah rather subordinate this production task to a political project of The Market, while for Foucault the subject itself is the cornerstone of the neoliberal project.

**Figure 4** Hierarchy of will and knowledge of contemporary economic theory formation based on Mirowski & Nik-Khah (2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Will (Neoliberalism as political project)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The market as a production task for economists <em>(market design)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market information (usually prices) as imperatives for market participants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **Knowledge and information of economics textbooks**

Taking up the theoretical remarks of the last two sections, I would now like to conclude by underpinning the thesis of a primarily productive nature of economic textbook knowledge. The “knowledge” captured in them is not the result of a conscious epistemic process which students should also be enabled to undertake. *The knowledge of textbooks is rather to be understood as a production task for a particular subjectivity*. It is intended to initiate and guide a process of subjectivation which is largely carried out by students themselves. As a productive task of (self-) guidance, the underpinning and realizing virtue of this process is to be understood as *political* and not epistemic in nature. It is about *shaping the world*, not

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5 I did this in detail in Bäuerle (2019: ch. 5).
The focus lies on the antithesis of a knowledge of the world − self-knowledge (cf. Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 41) − but as a self-knowledge that is not open to speculation or imagination but always presupposes what is to be recognized as inner truth. This productive intention of economic textbook literature becomes understandable in the context of the political project, which both Foucault and Mirovski and Nik-Khah addressed, which aims at an economic (self-)government of social processes.

Even though it can certainly not be assumed that all textbook authors deliberately guide and initiate the production task of a certain form of subjectivity, the ones I have focused on here are sometimes very explicit: “Our ultimate goal is to produce economic naturalists − people who see each human action as the result of an implicit or explicit cost-benefit calculation” (Frank et al., 2013, p. viii; emphasis L.B.). For his part, Mankiw emphasizes that he does not reflect his didactic work in an academic context, but in a political one. He connects the productive intention directly with the concept of information:

“In making these decisions [choosing textbook contents, L.B.], I am guided by the fact that, in introductory economics, the typical student is not a future economist but is a future voter. I include the topics that I believe are essential to help produce well-informed citizens” (Mankiw 2016, p. 170; emphasis L.B.).

Samuelson is also known to have at least partially discussed and developed his textbook from a political point of view:

“Let those who will write the nation’s laws if I can write its textbooks” (Barnett & Samuelson, 2007, p. 143).

“The coin for which he [any ambitious scholar, L.B.] works is influencing the mind of a generation” (Samuelson, 1977, p. 870).

If these political intentions are compared with the specific contents of their textbooks, they appear to be central building blocks of an education for the market. Zuidhof, on the basis of a discourse analysis of ten international introductory textbooks, comes to the conclusion that they do not foster an understanding or even criticism, but rather to the creation of markets (Zuidhof, 2014, p. 180). In this way they seem to be encouraging the market-constructivist, decidedly neoliberal aspirations of the economic sciences since the 1980s, as reconstructed by Mirovski and Nik-Kah.

Even if further quotations of this nature could be cited from Frank et al., Mankiw, Samuelson/Nordhaus and other textbook authors, this does not tell us anything about how exactly the process of shaping a certain subjectivity is ultimately designed, carried out and perceived. In the volume mentioned above, Silja Graupe addresses precisely this issue of the modus operandi of subjectivation or, as she calls it, of influencing processes. She shows that in the introductory chapters of the textbooks by Mankiw/Taylor and Samuelson/Nordhaus

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6 This is one possible explanation for the fact, that eminent economics textbook literature does not cover important facets of the real world, such as economic crises (Kapeller/Ötsch 2010), or only covers them in a paradigmatically pre-determined way (Liu et al., 2019 with reference to climate change).

7 An in-depth analysis of the process of the creation of the first 10 editions of Samuelson’s textbook suggests that political considerations had an important influence on the development of the book (Giraud, 2014).
alone, over ten linguistic techniques known to the cognitive sciences are implemented, all of
which have in common the ability to fundamentally change the emotionality, personality and
value base of the readers exposed to them (Graupe, 2017: Section 4.1; see also Graupe &
Steffestun 2018). The fact that at least Mankiw & Taylor (2014, p. 17) have some knowledge
of the kind of effect of their textbook has is suggested by their didactic orientation towards so
called “threshold concepts” by Meyer and Land, who characterize the potential impact of such
concepts as follows:

“We would argue further that as students acquire threshold concepts, and
extend their use of language in relation to these concepts, there occurs also a
shift in the learner’s subjectivity, a repositioning of the self.“ (Meyer & Land,

“The shift in perspective may lead to a transformation of personal identity, a
reconstruction of subjectivity. In such instances a transformed perspective is
likely to involve an affective component – a shift in values, feeling or attitude”
(Meyer & Land, 2003, p. 4).

Although these remarkably overt references and the findings of Graupe suggest that the
didactical editing of the textbook has undergone an exact weighing against the background of
their persuasive potential, it seems important to me at this point to stress that intentionality on
the part of textbook authors is by no means necessary for (economic) education to have a
productive effect in the above-mentioned sense. If students are primarily informed rather than
educated, it certainly helps the underlying subjectivation process if it is not consciously being
addressed or recognized. In this sense, also teachers, faculties or publishers can assume the
role of recipients of information (of curricula, PowerPoint slide sets, material to be dealt with)
and thus pick up and promote what is currently given, normal, dominant.8 An already
established discursive power in terms of content and structure can thus be consolidated and
expanded without conscious decisions by individual discourse participants.

This brings us to the adjective in the title of this essay. In my opinion, the knowledge
conveyed in economic textbooks can be described as “putative” if the concept of knowledge is
to contain a certain essence of consciousness; strictly speaking, a consciousness of process
regarding the genesis and thus also the limits of the known. Such a processual awareness
existed in the context of knowledge production in the 19th century. Cognitive processes were
closely observed and controlled in order to attain pure, objective knowledge. This consciously
controlled quality of knowledge is lost in the moment it is elevated to the status of an “eternal
truth” and becomes, as it were, a blueprint for the creation of the world. The actors in this
process – in this case students – usually have no awareness of the process in which they are
involved when learning “eternal truths”. The textbooks examined here, at least, do not contain
any possibilities with which they can enlighten themselves about or distance themselves from
the peculiarities of a productive understanding of knowledge. In this way, students take part in
a process they are not able to understand. Luckily, as recent empirical subjectivation research
finds, students do not take their teachers’ stories for granted at all but rather develop creative
ways in dealing with a curriculum that does not serve their original interests (Pühringer &
Bäuerle, 2019). Nevertheless, a risk of abandoning their own will by accepting a will that is
initially foreign to them remains. And this is precisely what the specific intention of the “will to

8 Sociology of science attests, that economics in particular has a strong tendency towards such self-
referential, academic modes of reproduction that amplify the same signal (Maeße, 2013).
power” entails: “The will which aims at power and which acts in power seeks the will of others as a counterpart. The former aims at overcoming the latter as will” (Gerhardt, 1996, p. 25; my translation). At the threshold of this overcoming lie the “eternal truths of economics”, which at the moment of their acceptance and reproduction allow individuals to emerge as economic subjects.

**Figure 5** Hierarchy of will and knowledge of contemporary economic theory formation based on Mirowski & Nik-Khah (2017)

Economic education [for political purposes] ([no] processual knowledge and [no] expression of will on the part of the actors)

- neoliberal textbook knowledge as information to guide subjectivation processes
- Market-orientated design of social processes by neoliberal informed subjects

### 8. Conclusion

The will and knowledge of early neoclassical economists, according to the thesis developed here, was epistemic in nature. Early neoclassical knowledge was the result of an epistemic process executed on the basis of conscious decisions. The driver of this epistemic process was the “will to willlessness” on the part of the scientific subject, which formed itself according to the epistemic virtue at hand – right up to its own self-banishment from the cognitive process. Subjectivity was considered a disturbance in the realization of the epistemic virtue of objectivity. On the other hand, the knowledge of important contemporary economic textbooks, such as those quoted here, must be systematically distinguished from epistemic processes. The knowledge contained in them is not the result of an epistemic process, but an imperative blueprint for the production of economic subjectivity among readers. (Economic) subjectivity thus no longer appears as a danger to (objective) knowledge, but as a continuous imperative in a market-shaped world.

Nevertheless, as the present essay suggests, with the study of the history of economics, as well as with the theoretical penetration of its epistemological preconditions, there exist ways and means to break through the boundaries of this understanding of knowledge as well as through those of objective, apparently selfless modes of knowledge. This study can show that the formation of this or that understanding of knowledge is based on decisions that are by no means already decided, but can be judged and made again and again by people. This freedom cannot be deprived of the human will and is a constitutive cornerstone of enlightenment. And this freedom can certainly not only be practiced in order to alter economic thinking, but in order to transform collective economic action in a willful, conscious manner. To see the self-declared truths of economists as one of the major threats to enlightened, critical sociality and individuality will be crucial in the sense of preserving and strengthening the latter, because:

“The truth, as conceived by modern economists, has not set anyone free. Instead, it brought about the death of the Kantian subject, and a subsequent

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9 Of course, this does not mean that the decisions automatically led to epistemic processes fulfilling the self-declared criteria, norms or “virtues” (cf. Mirowski, 1989, pp. 229-31, 272-74).
lifeworld hollowed out the humanist concerns that many people mistakenly think are heart and soul of a science of economics." (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017, p. 2).

With a strengthening of this kind of willful judgement in economic education, perhaps economists could again contribute to an awareness of forms of knowledge of the economic, which not least enable for a responsible shaping of social processes in a time driven by manifold crises.

Literature


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